Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on the idea of repeated encounters between the same two individuals. Here we examine direct reciprocity in structured populations, where individuals occupy the vertices of a graph. The edges denote who interacts with whom. The graph represents spatial structure or a social network. For birth-death or pairwise comparison updating, we find that evolutionary stability of direct reciprocity is more restrictive on a graph than in a well-mixed population, but the condition for reciprocators to be advantageous is less restrictive on a graph. For death-birth and imitation updating, in contrast, both conditions are easier to fulfill on a graph. Moreover, for all four update mechanisms, reciprocators can dominate defectors on a graph, which is never possible in a well-mixed population. We also study the effect of an error rate, which increases with the number of links per individual; interacting with more people simultaneously enhances the probability of making mistakes. We provide analytic derivations for all results. r
Introduction
Cooperation means that one individual pays a cost, c, for another individual to receive a benefit, b. Cost and benefit are measured in terms of reproductive success. Reproduction can be genetic or cultural. In the absence of a specific mechanism for evolution of cooperation, natural selection favors defectors. There are at least five mechanisms that can lead to the evolution of cooperation: kin selection, group selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity and network reciprocity. In this paper, we study the interaction between direct and network reciprocity.
Direct reciprocity is based on the idea of repeated encounters between two individuals (Trivers, 1971) according to the principle, 'I scratch your back and you scratch mine.' The game theoretic framework of direct reciprocity is the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, which has been the subject of numerous studies across various disciplines (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Axelrod, 1984; Selten and Hammerstein, 1984; Milinski, 1987; May, 1987; Axerlod and Dion, 1988; Fudenberg and Maskin, 1990; Imhof et al., 2005) . A large number of strategies for playing the repeated PD have been analyzed. The most prominent ones are tit-for-tat (TFT) (Axelrod, 1984) , generous-tit-for-tat (Nowak and Sigmund, 1992) , contrite-tit-for-tat (Sugden, 1986; Boerlijst et al., 1997) or win-stay, lose-shift (Nowak and Sigmund, 1993) . In general, it is a very difficult task to find successful strategies for playing the repeated PD (Axelrod, 1984; Kraines and Kraines, 1988; Fudenberg and Maskin, 1990; Lindgren, 1991) .
But if we merely want to analyze whether cooperation has any chance to evolve by direct reciprocity at all, then a very simple game can be studied. We only need to consider two strategies. Defectors, D, defect all the time. Cooperators, C, start with a cooperation and then continue to cooperate as long as the opponent cooperates, but defect if the opponent defects. These 'reciprocators' can be thought of as playing a strategy like TFT or Grim. TFT cooperates on the first move and then does whatever the opponent has done on the previous move. Grim cooperates until the opponent defects once and then permanently switches to defection.
Denote by w is the probability of playing another round. The average number of rounds between two individuals is given by 1=ð1 À wÞ. The payoff matrix for cooperators (reciprocators) versus defectors is given by
Two cooperators help each other in every round; each cooperator pays a cost c and receives a benefit b. A cooperator helps a defector only in the first round and then refuses help. Hence, a defector gets a single benefit, b, from a cooperator, who has a single cost, c. Defectors never help each other; their mutual payoff is zero. From payoff matrix (1) it is easy to see that cooperators are evolutionarily stable versus defectors if w4c=b.
If the probability of playing another round is greater than the cost-to-benefit ratio, then direct reciprocity allows evolution of cooperation. A similar result can be found in Trivers (1971) who ascribed it to a personal communication with Bill Hamilton. Another mechanism for evolution of cooperation is network reciprocity (Ohtsuki et al., 2006) . Cooperators and defectors occupy the vertices of a graph. Each cooperator pays a cost c for each of his neighbors to receive a benefit, b. Defectors pay no costs and distribute no benefits. In such a setting, cooperators can thrive in clusters (Nowak and May, 1992) . A surprisingly simple condition determines if cooperators can outcompete defectors. If the benefit-tocost ratio, b=c, is larger than the (average) number of neighbors, k, then cooperators can win:
This result holds for death-birth (DB) updating and weak selection (Ohtsuki et al., 2006) . DB updating means that a random individual is chosen to die, and the neighbors compete for the empty site proportional to their fitness. Network reciprocity is the generalization of spatial reciprocity (Nowak and May, 1992) to evolutionary graph theory (Lieberman et al., 2005) . There has been much interest for studying evolutionary game dynamics in spatial settings (Matsuda, 1987; Vickers, 1989; Hutson and Vickers, 1992; May, 1992, 1993; Herz, 1994; Lindgren and Nordahl, 1994; Nowak et al., 1994; Killingback and Doebeli, 1996; Nakamaru et al., 1997 Nakamaru et al., , 1998 ; Szabo´and T + oke, 1998; van Baalen and Rand , 1998; Szabo´e t al., 2000; Szabo´and Hauert, 2002; Brandt et al., 2003; Hauert and Doebeli, 2004; Ifti et al., 2004; Iwasa, 2005, 2006) and on graphs (Abramson and Kuperman, 2001; Hauert and Szabo´, 2005; Santos and Pacheco, 2005; Antal et al., 2006; Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2006a; Santos et al., 2006a, b) . There is a long-standing research effort to study how population structure affects evolutionary (Maruyama, 1970; Wilson, 1975; Slatkin, 1981; Anderson and May, 1991; Barton, 1993; Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani, 2001; Whitlock, 2003) and ecological dynamics (Levin and Paine, 1974; Levin, 1992; Hassell et al., 1994; Durrett and Levin, 1994; Durrett, 1999; Neuhauser, 2001; Dunne, 2006; May, 2006) . In this paper, we bring together direct and network reciprocity. The individuals of a population occupy the vertices of a graph and play the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with all their neighbors. Hence, we study the evolution of direct reciprocity in a spatial setting and in social networks. Nakamaru et al. (1997 Nakamaru et al. ( , 1998 are precursors in this direction. They studied the competition between TFT and unconditional-defector (ALLD) strategies on cycles and square lattices adopting pair approximation, pair-edge approximation, and methods of stochastic processes. They found that lattices promote cooperation; in particular, TFT can invade an ALLD-population. In addition, they studied two different updating rules, called the scoredependent fertility model and the score-dependent viability model, respectively, and found that the former is more favorable for cooperation than the latter.
Here we will derive the fundamental conditions for the evolution of cooperation in a model where direct reciprocity and network reciprocity occur simultaneously. We study both infinite and finite populations whose structure is described by a regular graph. We study four different updating mechanisms and provide analytic derivations for all results. Our calculation is based on weak selection.
In Section 2 we make preliminary remarks about evolutionary game dynamics in finite and infinite populations and about evolutionary graph theory. In Section 3 we discuss direct reciprocity in a well-mixed population. In Section 4 we discuss direct reciprocity on graphs. In Section 5, we introduce the idea of an error rate that increases with the number of interacting partners. Section 6 is the conclusion.
Preliminary remarks

Evolutionary stability, risk-dominance and the
3 rule
Evolutionary game theory studies frequency dependent selection; the fitness of individuals is not constant, but depends on the composition of the population (Maynard Smith, 1982; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 2003; Nowak and Sigmund, 2004) . Consider a game between two strategies S 1 and S 2 given by the payoff matrix
The quantities a ij denote the payoff for strategy S i versus S j . Strategy S 1 is a strict Nash equilibrium (or evolutionarily stable) if a 11 4a 21 . This means that an infinitely large population of S 1 players cannot be invaded by S 2 under deterministic selection dynamics.
In an infinite population, if a 11 4a 21 and a 12 oa 22 then both strategies are evolutionarily stable. The replicator equation (Taylor and Jonker, 1978; Hofbauer et al., 1979; Weibull, 1995; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998) admits an unstable mixed equilibrium. Strategy S 1 is risk-dominant (RD) if it has the bigger basin of attraction. This is the case if a 11 þ a 12 4a 21 þ a 22 .
In a population of finite size, the crucial quantity is the fixation probability of a strategy, defined as the probability that the lineage arising from a single mutant of that strategy will take over the entire population consisting of the other strategy Taylor et al., 2004) . If
then the fixation probability of strategy S 1 is greater than the inverse of the population size, 1=N. This means selection favors the replacement of S 2 by S 1 , and therefore a single S 1 player in a population of S 2 players is an advantageous mutant. The condition can be expressed as a 1 3 rule: if the fitness of the invading S 1 at a frequency of 1 3 is greater than the fitness of the resident S 2 then the fixation probability of S 1 is greater than 1=N Imhof and Nowak, 2006) . This condition holds in the limit of weak selection.
Note also: if S 1 is RD when compared to S 2 , which means that a 11 þ a 12 4a 21 þ a 22 , then the fixation probability of S 1 is greater than the fixation probability of S 2 for weak selection and large population size Imhof and Nowak, 2006) .
Games on graphs
Imagine the individuals of a population arranged on the vertices of a graph. Each vertex is occupied by one individual which plays a particular strategy. There are no empty vertices. The edges determine who interacts with whom. Each individual obtains its payoff by playing the game with all connected individuals. There can be a number of different update mechanisms, which specify how the composition of the population changes under natural selection.
Birth-death (BD) updating means that at any one timestep an individual is selected for reproduction proportional to fitness; the offspring replaces a randomly chosen neighbor. For pairwise comparison (PC) updating a randomly chosen player compares payoffs with his random neighbor; a player adopts the strategy of the other player with a certain probability depending on payoff (Traulsen et al., 2006) . DB updating means that a random individual is selected to die (or to update its strategy) and the neighbors compete for the empty site proportional to their fitness (we note that DB updating corresponds to the scoredependent fertility model by Nakamaru et al., 1998) . Imitation (IM) updating means that a randomly chosen player either stays with his own strategy or adopts one of the neighbors' strategies proportional to fitness.
Each of these update rules specifies a stochastic process which defines how the composition of the population (that is the coloring of the graph) changes over time. For weak selection and large population size, the evolutionary game dynamics on regular graphs can be studied by a deterministic replicator equation with a transformed payoff matrix (Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2006b ). This 'replicator equation on graphs' describes how the expected frequency of each strategy changes over time. For a game between two strategies, the transformed payoff matrix is given by
The term, H, depends on the update rule. For BD and PC updating, we have
For DB updating, we have
For IM updating, we have
The parameter k denotes the degree of the graph, which is the number of neighbors of each individual. Note that all three expressions of H converge to 0 as k ! 1; therefore, the normal payoff matrix (and hence the standard replicator equation) is obtained in the limit where every individual interacts with every other individual, which is the case of the complete graph. The calculation is based on pair-approximation for regular graphs with degree kX3 and can be found in Ohtsuki and Nowak (2006b) . Note that BD and PC updating favors the risk dominant strategy, while DB and IM updating favors strategy S 1 if a 11 is large and a 22 is small. We can use this formalism to study any game on any regular graph. In this paper, we investigate the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma.
Direct reciprocity in a well-mixed population
Let us now use the formalism of Section 2.1 to study direct reciprocity in a well-mixed population, where every individual interacts equally likely with every other individual. Recall from the introduction that the characteristic payoff matrix of direct reciprocity is of the form
Thus it is easy to see that cooperators are evolutionarily stable if w4c=b. This condition can also be written as
In this case, a single defector in an infinitely large population of cooperators has a lower fitness. It is still possible, however, that in a finite population the fixation probability of a single defector, r D , is greater than the inverse of the population size, 1=N.
If we want defectors to be disadvantageous, we must ask that r D o1=N. For weak selection and large population size this is the case if
This condition ensures that the basin of attraction of cooperators is greater than 
In this case, we have r C 4r D for weak selection and large population size. For cooperators to be advantageous, we must ask that r C 41=N. For weak selection and large population size this is the case if
This condition ensures that the basin of attraction of cooperators is greater than 2 3 . Note that inequalities (11)-(14) demand increasing b=c ratios. Only if inequality (14) holds is the fixation probability of a single cooperator in a population of defectors greater than that of a neutral mutant (which is 1=N).
Direct reciprocity and network reciprocity
Let us now study direct reciprocity on graphs. We use the formalism outlined in Section 2.2 to construct the relevant payoff matrix, and then we use the formalism of Section 2.1.
PC or BD updating
If we use BD updating or PC, then direct reciprocity on a graph with degree k can be described by the transformed payoff matrix
where
From payoff matrix (15) we obtain that cooperators are evolutionarily stable if
Evolutionary stability on a graph means that not a single mutant but a small fraction of rare mutants (in the proper configuration) cannot spread. Note that condition (17) demands a larger b=c ratio than the corresponding condition (11) for well-mixed populations. Hence, the structured population makes it harder for direct reciprocity to be evolutionarily stable (for PC or BD updating). Spatial effects oppose cooperation in this setting. We observe that the condition for defectors to be disadvantageous, r D o1=N, is also harder to fulfill on a graph with small k:
The condition for cooperators to be RD, however, is identical for structured and unstructured populations:
Surprisingly, the condition for cooperators to be advantageous, r C 41=N, is less restrictive on a graph
For the first time we observe an advantage caused by network reciprocity (graph selection). Note that all conditions (17)- (20) converge to the corresponding conditions (11)-(14) for large k. A wellmixed population (which is sometimes called an unstructured population) is simply given by a complete graph where all individuals are connected to each other. Note also that the critical b=c ratios expressed by inequalities (17) and (18) are declining functions of the degree of the graph, k, while inequality (20) specifies a critical b=c ratio which is an increasing function of k.
The reason why the network opposes cooperators in conditions (17) and (18) and favors cooperators in condition (20) can be seen by inspecting the quantity H, given by Eq. (16). Note that H40 if and only if b=c4ð2 À wÞ=w. This inequality is precisely the condition for cooperators to be risk dominant. For smaller b=c ratios, H is negative and therefore the effect of the network is to oppose cooperators. For larger b=c ratios, H is positive and therefore the effect of the network is to favor cooperators. In general, PC or BD updating favors the risk dominant strategy; as can be seen from Eq. (7).
Finally, we note that payoff matrix (15) is also compatible with cooperators to dominate defectors. This is the case if
If this condition holds, then selection favors cooperators over the entire frequency range. In well-mixed populations, direct reciprocity alone never allows cooperators to dominate defectors.
DB updating
Next we study direct reciprocity on a graph using DB updating. The transformed payoff matrix is the same as (15), but H is different from the previous example. It is given by
From (22) we obtain the following results. Cooperators are evolutionarily stable if
Defectors are disadvantageous, r D o1=N, if
Cooperators are RD over defectors if
Cooperators are advantageous, r C 41=N, if
Finally, cooperators dominate defectors if
All critical b=c ratios are increasing functions of k. Each of the conditions (23)-(27) demands a lower b=c ratio than the corresponding condition in a well-mixed population. Therefore, DB updating always facilitates the evolution of cooperation on graphs. Intuitively, this is because cooperators compete with defectors who are not always immediate neighbors of each other. The intuition behind the difference between BD and DB updating is easiest to see for games on cycles (Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2006a) .
In Table 1 , we summarize the five conditions for wellmixed populations, as well as for BD and DB updating on graphs. In the Appendix A, we derive the five conditions for IM updating. Table 2 shows the critical b=c ratios for cooperators to be evolutionarily stable for BD and DB updating on graphs and in a well-mixed population. For BD updating we observe that small k opposes cooperation: the ESS conditions are stricter than a well-mixed population. For DB updating, in contrast, smaller k greatly favors cooperation: the ESS conditions are easier to fulfill than a well-mixed population. The parameter k denotes the degree of the graph: the number of neighbors per individual. Our calculations are valid for kX3. The wellmixed population is the limit k ! 1. Table 3 shows the critical b=c ratios for cooperators to be advantageous (meaning to have a fixation probability greater than the inverse of the population size). Both BD and DB updating favor cooperation on graphs compared to a well-mixed population, but the effect is small for BD updating. For DB updating, we need either small k or large w in order to get small b=c thresholds. If w is small, then cooperation can only evolve because of network reciprocity. This case corresponds to frequent updating: players change their strategies after having a few interactions. If w is close to one, on the other hand, then network reciprocity has only a small effect. Table 4 shows the critical b=c ratio for cooperators to dominate defectors. In a well-mixed population, this is never possible. For small b=c thresholds we need small k. For BD updating we need small k and large w. Table 1 The critical b=c ratios Well mixed BD DB Table 2 The critical b=c ratios for C to be an ESS 
Numerical examples
ARTICLE IN PRESS
C is ESS 1 w 1 w Á kÀw kÀ1 k 2 Àw kþðk 2 ÀkÀ1Þw r D o1=Nw BD DB Well mixed k ¼ 3 k ¼ 10 k ¼ 100 k ¼ 3 k ¼ 10 k ¼ 100
Erroneous moves
Errors are always important when considering the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (May, 1987; Boyd, 1989; Nowak and Sigmund, 1990; Fudenberg and Harris, 1992; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998 ). Here we can study the effect of an error rate that is an increasing function of the number of different people with whom one person is interacting.
Suppose the cooperators, C, use the TFT strategy, but in each round of the game they mistakenly choose the wrong move with probability s. If s is strictly positive and if the game is infinitely repeated (w ! 1), then the average payoff per round is given by
Note that two TFT players simply get the average payoff of the four possible outcomes, b À c, Àc, b and 0. The defectors, D, use the 'always defect' (ALLD) strategy without making any mistakes (they do not even know how to cooperate). Hence, two defectors have 0 payoff. In the game between TFT and ALLD, TFT cooperates by mistake with probability s.
Interacting with more people simultaneously requires more memory and more cognitive abilities. Hence, we expect that the error rate s is an increasing function of k. Suppose that s is given by
The maximum error rate is s ¼ 1 2 as k ! 1; in this case TFT behaves like the random strategy which flips an unbiased coin for every move. The parameter k denotes the number of interacting partners at which the error rate is s ¼ 1 4 (which is half of its maximum value). Table 5 shows the critical b=c ratio for cooperators to be advantageous mutants. Even for the infinitely repeated game (w ! 1), we need small k in order to have reasonably small b=c thresholds. Playing on a sparse graph becomes essential.
Discussion
Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for evolution of cooperation, based on the idea of repeated encounters between the same two individuals (Trivers, 1971) . Direct reciprocity requires accurate recognition of other players, an excellent memory of past moves and a not too heavily discounted future (May, 1987) . Complicated behavioral strategies can emerge in the framework of direct reciprocity (Axelrod, 1984) . Network reciprocity is based on the idea that each individual only (or predominantly) interacts with a well-defined, small subset of the population (Ohtsuki et al., 2006) . In this case, there is no need for complicated cognitive abilities. Unconditional cooperators can prevail over defectors. Network reciprocity is the generalization of spatial reciprocity (Nowak and May, 1992) to evolutionary graph theory (Lieberman et al., 2005) .
In this paper, we have analyzed the interplay between direct and network reciprocity. The individuals of a population occupy the vertices of a graph. Neighbors play the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Thereby, all players accumulate a payoff which is translated into fitness. Our aim is to derive the critical b=c ratio, which favors evolution of cooperation. In the limit of weak selection and large population size, this critical ratio depends only on two parameters: (i) the probability w to play another round in the repeated game; and (ii) the number k of neighbors per individual. In order to calculate the critical b=c ratio, we only need to study the interaction between two simple strategies: defectors use 'always defect' (ALLD), cooperators use TFT.
We have studied four update rules for the evolutionary dynamics. BD and PC updating give rise to identical results. DB and IM updating lead to results that differ qualitatively from BD updating. BD (and PC) updating Table 3 The critical b=c ratios for C to be advantageous mutants Table 4 The critical b=c ratios for C to dominate D w BD DB Well mixed Table 5 The critical b=c ratios for TFT to be advantageous mutants in an infinitely repeated PD makes it harder for cooperators to be evolutionarily stable, but easier to be advantageous. Cooperators are advantageous if a single cooperator starting in a random position on the graph has a fixation probability greater than the inverse of the population size. DB and IM updating make it easier for cooperators to be evolutionarily stable and advantageous. For DB and IM updating there is always a synergistic interaction between network reciprocity and direct reciprocity. For DB and IM updating we find that we need either small k or large w in order to obtain reasonably small critical b=c ratios for the evolution of cooperation. Thus, either strong network reciprocity (small k) or strong direct reciprocity (large w) is sufficient for the evolution of cooperation. Any one of the two mechanisms is enough to ensure that cooperators (reciprocators) are favored.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
On a graph (with finite k), it is possible that cooperators dominate defectors, which means that selection favors cooperators over the entire frequency range. In order to obtain small b=c ratios for cooperators to dominate defectors we need small k. Nakamaru et al. (1997 Nakamaru et al. ( , 1998 ) studied the interaction between TFT and ALLD strategies on lattices. Quantitative comparison between the present study and Nakamaru et al. is difficult, as our calculation is based on weak selection while theirs is not. Qualitatively, however, our result agrees with that of Nakamaru et al.; (i) spatial structure generally facilitates cooperation, (ii) smaller k and larger w favor cooperation more, and (iii) TFT can dominate ALLD even though ALLD is an evolutionarily stable strategy in a well-mixed population.
Finally, we have explored the effect of an error rate which increases with the number of interacting partners per individual. In this case, we find again that small k is necessary for evolution of cooperation at reasonably small b=c ratios. Therefore, in the context of a realistic error rate (which is related to the social complexity of the situation), direct reciprocity is only effective if played in a well-defined social network where each individual has meaningful interactions only with a few others.
